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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between 
ethnic heterogeneity and redistribution, by using the recent and massive 
arrival of immigrants in Spain. Specifically, we focus on the effect of 
changes in immigrant density, recorded between 1998 and 2006, on 
contemporaneous changes in municipal welfare spending. We instrument 
for immigrant density using established settlement patterns per country 
of origin so as to assign predicted flows of immigrants to municipalities. 
We find that welfare spending increased less in those municipalities that 
recorded the largest increases in immigrant density. We also provide 
evidence of a positive relationship between immigrant density and the 
vote share accruing to right-wing parties. Hence, our results are 
consistent with theories that predict a negative relationship between 
ethnic heterogeneity and redistribution. 
 
 
Resumen: En este trabajo se analiza la relación entre la heterogeneidad 
étnica y la redistribución, utilizando la reciente y masiva llegada de 
inmigrantes a España. En concreto, se estudia el efecto de los cambios 
en la densidad de inmigrantes, observada entre 1998 y 2006, sobre los 
cambios en el gasto social municipal. La densidad de inmigrantes se 
instrumenta utilizando los patrones de establecimiento por país de origen 
para asignar los flujos predichos de inmigrantes a cada municipio. Los 
resultados evidencian que el gasto social incrementó menos en los 
municipios con mayores incrementos en la densidad de inmigrantes. 
También se proporciona evidencia de la existencia de una relación 
positiva entre la densidad de inmigrantes y el porcentaje de voto 
obtenidos por los partidos de derecha. Por tanto, estos resultados son 
consistentes con las teorías que predicen una relación negativa entre la 
heterogeneidad étnica y la redistribución. 
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1. Introduction 
Ethnic heterogeneity may affect individual preferences for income redistribution if there is a 
tendency to favor redistributive policies among beneficiaries belonging to one’s same ethnic 
group (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). Indeed, Alesina et al. (2001) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) 
argue that ethnic heterogeneity may be an important factor in accounting for the marked 
difference in size between the US and European public sectors. Most European countries, 
however, are becoming increasingly ethnically heterogeneous as a result of immigration with the 
foreign-born tending to differ from the native population in terms of their culture, race and 
religion. A natural implication, therefore, of the conclusion that ethnic heterogeneity reduces 
redistribution is that immigration represents a challenge to the more generous European welfare 
states (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). 
Although Spain has traditionally been a country of emigration, it has received massive 
inflows of immigrants in recent times. Between 1998 and 2008, the proportion of foreign-born 
within the total population increased from 2.9 to 13.1 percent. This large immigration wave 
transformed Spain into an ethnically heterogeneous country in a remarkably short period of time, 
making it an appropriate testing ground for examining the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on 
redistribution. We aim to shed light on this question by estimating the effect of local immigrant 
density on municipal welfare expenditure (defined as spending on social services and benefits), 
exploiting the highly uneven geographical distribution of immigrant inflows within Spain.  
We resort to an instrumental variables approach to identify the effect of immigrant 
density on municipal welfare spending. The instrument that we use is based on the existence of 
network effects and has been recently used by Saiz (2007), Cortes (2008), Card (2009), González 
and Ortega (2010) and Peri (2011). Network effects imply that the location decisions of new 
immigrants from a given country are largely determined by the past location decisions of 
immigrants from the same country. Hence, we instrument for immigrant density by using 
established settlement patterns per country of origin to assign predicted flows of immigrants to 
municipalities. 
We first estimate the effect of immigrant density on welfare spending using cross-
sectional data for 2006. In a second exercise, we focus on the effect of changes recorded in 
immigrant density between 1998 and 2006 on contemporaneous changes in municipal welfare 
spending. Our results support the hypothesis that ethnic heterogeneity reduces income 
redistribution. Specifically, the results of our preferred instrumental variables changes 
specification imply that the 1998-2006 average immigrant density increase (5.84 percentage 
4 
 
points) decreased the percentage of the municipal budget allocated to welfare by 26 percent of 
the 2006 level. Consistent with these results, we also find a sizable positive impact of immigrant 
density on the vote share accruing to right-wing parties. 
Several empirical studies have examined the link between ethnic heterogeneity and 
redistribution with mixed results1. One strand of the US literature has examined self-reported 
measures of support for redistribution using the General Social Survey. Luttmer (2001) shows 
that people in the US are more likely to express support for welfare spending if they live in a 
neighborhood where their own ethnic group is highly represented among welfare recipients. By 
contrast, Alesina et al. (2001) find no evidence that whites living in more heterogeneous states are 
less likely to support welfare. Finally, Lind (2007) computes indices of income inequality within 
and between ethnic groups at the US state level, concluding that while income inequality between 
groups tends to reduce support for redistribution, income inequality within groups tends to 
increase it.  
Non-US studies examining self-reported measures of support for redistribution include 
Senik et al. (2009) and Dahlberg et al. (2011). Senik et al. (2009) use data from the European 
Social Survey (2002/2003) and find weak evidence of a negative relationship between the 
perceived presence of immigrants and natives’ support for redistribution. Dahlberg et al. (2011) 
estimate the effect of immigrant density on individual preferences for redistribution in Swedish 
municipalities. These authors exploit an exogenous variation in municipal immigrant density 
induced by a refugee placement program, finding that ethnic heterogeneity results in less support 
for redistribution. 
Other US studies have examined the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on observed levels of 
spending on welfare programs. Ribar and Wilhelm (1999) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) 
examine variation in the generosity of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
programs across the US states. Their results indicate that an increase in the share of African-
Americans decreases the average AFDC monthly payment. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, given that Spain is a 
country whose ethnic heterogeneity has increased rapidly in recent years, we analyze the change 
in welfare spending in a society that has undergone a transition from a largely homogeneous 
ethnic community to one that is considerably more heterogeneous. Second, the fact that Spain’s 
municipalities are relatively small (see Section 2) means that municipal immigrant density 
                                                 
1 See Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Stichnoth and Van der Straeten 
(2009) for surveys on this topic. 
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measures provide a better proxy of ethnic background than those used in studies conducted at 
broader geographical levels (e.g. the US states). Third, to deal with the non-randomness of 
municipal immigrant density we adopt an instrumental variables approach. In relation to the 
existing literature, our paper is most closely in line with: (i) Ribar and Wilhelm (1999) and Alesina 
and Glaeser (2004) in that we look at actual welfare spending and (ii) Dahlberg et al. (2011) in 
that we use municipal data and an exogenous change in immigrant density to identify the effect 
of ethnic heterogeneity on welfare spending.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and 
summarizes the variables used in the analysis. Section 3 describes the econometric specifications 
and the paper’s identification strategy. In section 4 we present and discuss the results. Section 5 
concludes. 
  
2. Data and variables 
Data: Spain is a fiscally decentralized country with three layers of government: central 
government, 17 regional governments (Comunidades Autónomas) and more than 8,000 
municipalities2. Unfortunately, we are unable to consider the whole universe of Spain’s local 
government as detailed fiscal data is unavailable for some (mostly small) municipalities. 
Moreover, we have to exclude the municipalities in the Basque Country and Navarra since, for 
historical reasons, these regions have their own fiscal regimes. Thus, for our 2006 cross-sectional 
analysis, we are able to include 1,293 municipalities in our sample3. The population size 
distribution of the sample of municipalities that we use is summarized in Table A1, which is 
deferred to the Annex. Despite excluding a large number of municipalities, our sample accounts 
for 78% of the Spanish population (not including that part residing in the Basque Country or 
Navarra). Moreover, it includes 93% of the municipalities with more than 100 thousand 
inhabitants, 81% of the municipalities with a population between 20 and 100 thousand 
inhabitants and 65% of the municipalities with a population between 5 and 20 thousand 
inhabitants.  
Municipal welfare spending: The public spending of Spanish municipalities represents 
around 13% of total public spending and municipal governments enjoy a large degree of 
                                                 
2 These coexist with Diputaciones, Comarques, Consells Insulars and Cabildos. See Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-
Navarro (2008) for more information on these upper-layers local governments. These governments play 
an important role in financing municipal investment through capital grants. 
3 Although data for 2007 are available, we use 2006 data because municipal elections were held in May 
2007. This would have meant that the fiscal data for 2007 would have been generated in two different 
legislatures.  
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autonomy in decisions regarding taxation and spending. We assume that municipal fiscal policies 
are, by and large, shaped by the preferences of the native population. Two considerations 
substantiate this assumption: first, only Spanish, EU and Norwegian citizens can vote in 
municipal elections4; and, second, foreign-born individuals who can vote (foreign-born Spanish 
citizens) have a markedly lower voter turnout (around 20 percent, see Duran-Muñóz, 2011 for 
details) 5.  
In 2006, local taxes represented 40% of the (aggregate) current revenue of municipal 
governments, user charges accounted for a further 25% and the remainder comprised inter-
governmental grants.  Several taxes are levied at the municipal level: a property tax, a local 
business tax, a tax on vehicles, a tax on building activities, and a tax on the sale of land and 
buildings. Within limits that vary by population size, municipalities are free to set their own tax 
rates. Inter-governmental grants are, by and large, formula-based block grants. They are (virtually) 
fully distributed on a population basis that establishes different per capita amounts for different 
population size intervals. These intervals coincide with those defined by the Spanish tax law in 
relation to maximum tax rates. 
As for expenditure, municipalities are multi-purpose governments with major spending 
categories corresponding to the traditional responsibilities of local governments excluding 
education. These spending categories include police and fire protection (on average, 8% of total 
spending), housing, street lighting and cleaning (15%), water supply and waste treatment (13%), 
culture and sports (14%), local roads and economic development programs (15%), and general 
services (20%). Health care and education are primarily the responsibility of regional 
governments and, as a result, municipalities only spend 1 and 4% of their budgets on these items. 
In 2006, 11% of aggregate municipal spending was devoted to welfare6. Occupational 
training courses and programs providing assistance in job finding represent the largest share of 
this spending category. It also includes welfare programs to help individuals (and households) 
experiencing economic and/or social problems7. In this respect, some municipalities provide in-
                                                 
4 However, only Spanish citizens can vote in regional and national elections. 
5 Municipal elections are held every four years. In the period we examine, these took place in 1999, 2003 
and 2007. Parties present closed lists and the d’Hondt formula is used to translate number of votes into 
representatives. 
6 Welfare spending is defined as total spending in chapter 3 (Seguridad, Protección y Promoción Social) of 
Classificación Funcional del Gasto. As for the other items of expenditure, Police -and fire protection- 
corresponds to chapter 2, Health 4.1; Education 4.2; Housing, street lighting and cleaning 4.3; Water 
supply and waste treatment 4.4, Culture and sports 4.5; and Local roads and economic development is the 
sum of chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
7 Theses programs do not include the unemployment insurance, which is a responsibility of the central 
government. 
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kind transfers, which might include soup kitchens, supervised flats or residences8. Notice that 
these programs are clearly among the most redistributive municipal expenditures. This is the 
reason why we focus on this particular spending category. It is important to emphasize that, in 
Spain, natives and immigrants (regardless of their legal status) have equal access to these 
municipal services (see below). 
Table 1 presents summary statistics and the top panel of Figure 1a summarizes the 
distribution of municipal welfare spending in 2006. The average expenditure in welfare programs 
was 112€ per capita with a coefficient of variation of 63%, indicating substantial variation in this 
expenditure across municipalities9. In the bottom panel of Figure 1a, we summarize the changes 
in welfare spending (in € per capita) between 1998 and 2006. There has been an increase in the 
municipal resources devoted to welfare programs during this period (the average increase in our 
sample is 56€ per capita in nominal terms). This increase coincided with a long period of 
economic expansion in which the average annual real growth of the Spanish economy was 3.8%. 
Figure 1b shows that welfare spending as a percentage of total spending also exhibited 
substantial variation across the municipalities - both in its 2006 level and in the changes recorded 
between 1998 and 2006. This variation in the resources devoted to welfare reflects the high 
degree of autonomy enjoyed by Spain’s municipalities in their spending decisions. On the one 
hand, upper-level governments do not set any minimum standards as regards specific spending 
programs; on the other hand, the vast majority of grants received by municipal governments are 
not ear-marked.  
[Insert Table 1 and Figures 1a and 1b here] 
Spain’s immigration wave and immigrant density: During the period we study, Spain 
experienced a massive increase in its foreign-born population. This wave of immigration is 
illustrated in Figure 2. The immigration inflows accounts for roughly 80% of total population 
growth between 1998 and 2006 (almost 5 million inhabitants). The percentage of foreign-born 
individuals nationwide increased from 2.9 to 10.8 between 1998 and 2006, the period we study. If 
                                                 
8 Some (small) municipalities do not provide all of these services directly but rather buy them from upper-
levels of government. Our spending measure includes the costs of these indirect forms of provision.  
9 The Local Government Act assigns different responsibilities to municipalities of different sizes (see Solé-
Ollé and Bosch-Roca, 2005, for a more complete description of this). The Act establishes that 
municipalities with less than 20 thousand inhabitants are not obliged to provide welfare services. Despite 
this, many municipalities below this population threshold do provide welfare services (Mas and Vilalta, 
2006). In fact, regressing welfare spending per capita on a variable that indicates if it is mandatory for the 
municipality to provide welfare services yields an R-squared value that is as low as 0.2%. 
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we focus our attention solely on individuals born outside the EU-15 countries, this percentage 
rose from 1.7 to 8.6. In Table A2, we list the 1998 and 2006 figures for the number of foreign-
born individuals by their country of origin, together with the inflow recorded between these two 
years. The table shows that the highest inflows originated from Morocco, South America (above 
all Ecuador and Colombia), and Eastern Europe (especially Romania). The result of this 
immigration was the increased ethnic heterogeneity of Spain, a trait that is commonly measured 
in the literature using the fractionalization index (see Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, for details). 
We computed this index using the country of origin as the source of ethnic heterogeneity and 
found that it almost quadrupled between 1998 and 2006 rising from 0.06 to 0.2. The index can be 
interpreted as the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from the overall population 
belong to different ethnic groups. Since this paper focuses on the behavior of the native 
population, we will use immigrant density as a proxy of ethnic heterogeneity. Notice that the 
proportion of immigrants in the overall population reflects the probability of a member of the 
native population meeting a foreign-born individual. 
A significant fraction of immigrants do not hold residence permits (roughly a third of non 
EU-15 immigrants in 2006). However, in Spain, all immigrants enjoy access to municipal services 
as well as education and health care (provided by regional governments). To have access to these 
services, immigrants only need to be enrolled in the municipal register (Padrón Municipal). To do 
so, immigrants do not need to provide proof of their legal status. Thus, immigrants have the 
incentive to enroll in the municipal register in order to have access to the described public 
services. At the same time, the main inter-governmental grant received by municipalities is 
determined by its population level as it appears in this register. 
   [Insert Figure 2 here] 
In the empirical analysis we adopt a restrictive definition of immigrant by excluding those 
individuals born in the EU-15 countries. Figure 3 and Table 1 describe the distribution of 
immigrant density, defined as the percentage of non EU-15 individuals in the municipality. The 
top panel of Figure 3 shows the distribution in 2006 while the bottom panel describes the change 
in this distribution between 1998 and 2006. The average immigrant density in 2006 was 6.78, 
there being an average increase of 5.84, which reflects the size of the average immigrant influx in 
the period of interest. In addition, Figure 3 and Table 1 highlight a substantial variation in 
municipal immigrant densities, which is a feature we exploit in the empirical analysis.  
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   [Insert Figure 3 here] 
3. Econometric specification and identification issues 
The baseline cross-sectional specification is:  
   06060606 +′+⋅= iiii εφxdensity immigrantβwelfare                           (1) 
where 06iwelfare  is the welfare spending in municipality i in 200610, 06idensity immigrant  is the 
percentage of individuals born outside EU-15 countries in the municipality in 2006, and 06iε  is an 
error term. The term 06′ix  is a vector of control variables accounting for differences in fiscal 
capacity and expenditure needs across municipalities measured in 2006. This vector contains the 
current grants per capita, the municipal property tax base per capita, the debt service of the 
municipal government, and dummies for population size intervals that identify homogenous 
municipalities in terms of common maximum tax rates and spending responsibilities. It also 
includes the size of population groups with specific expenditure needs: the percentage of young 
(under 16 years of age) and old (over 64) individuals and the percentage of unemployed. The 
definitions, summary statistics and sources of these variables are provided in Table 1. 
As shown above, the foreign-born population increased substantially in the period we 
study. At the same time, the overall increase hides a considerable degree of heterogeneity across 
municipalities. To exploit this interesting feature of our data, we use a changes specification 
where the change in welfare spending recorded between 1998 and 2006 is regressed on the 
change in immigrant density over the same time window. This specification in changes is:  
        06−9806−989806−9806−98 +′+⋅+⋅= iiiii uφxΔwelfareδdensity ΔimmigrantβwelfareΔ                  (2) 
where 06−98′ixΔ  is a vector containing the changes in the control variables defined above and 
06−98iu  is an error term reflecting shocks in the change of welfare spending. To control for mean 
reversion in welfare spending, we introduce the level of welfare spending at the base year (i.e. 
1998). 
Despite controlling for observable spending determinants by proxying the fiscal capacity 
and the expenditure needs of municipalities and time-invariant spending determinants – in the 
changes specification, there is the risk that shocks in unobserved spending determinants will 
confound our estimates. Hence, we adopt an instrumental variables approach. 
                                                 
10 Throughout the paper, we use two different measures of welfare, in per capita terms and as a percentage 
of total spending. 
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The instrument we use is based on a ‘shift-share’ of national levels of immigration by 
country of origin into municipalities. In the cross-sectional exercise (equation 1), the instrument 
we use is the immigrant density that would have been observed if, for each country of origin, the 
geographical distribution of immigrants across municipalities in 2006 had perfectly mimicked its 
distribution in 1998. The predicted immigrant density for 2006 is constructed as: 
       
98
061998
98
0606 ∑ ⋅==
i
c
c
ic
i
i
i population
immigrantsγ
population
immigrantsdensityimmigrant                                     (3) 
where 1998icγ  is the (nationwide) share of foreign-born individuals that were living in municipality i 
from country c in 1998 whereas 06cimmigrants  is the number of foreign-born from country c living 
in Spain in 2006, and 98ipopulation  is the total population in municipality i in 1998. The rationale 
for this instrument can be explained as follows. Prior to 1998, municipality i attracted a large 
community of immigrants from country c, say Morocco. Due to network effects, more recent 
immigrants from Morocco also located in municipality i, perhaps to avoid discrimination in the 
housing and labor markets. Hence, if there is a large influx of immigrants from Morocco to Spain 
in a given period, the population of immigrants in municipality i will increase disproportionately 
because Moroccans had settled in this municipality in the past. In the changes specification 
(equation 2), we instrument the 1998-2006 increase in immigrant density with its predicted 
increase, which is defined as follows: 
9806 −= ii06-i98 density immigrantdensityimmigrant density immigrantΔ              (4) 
Since Altonji and Card’s (1991) study, there has been a long tradition in the literature of 
using the early settlement patterns of immigrants to construct instruments to estimate the effect 
of immigration on a range of economic outcomes. More recent examples include Saiz (2007), 
Cortes (2008), Card (2009), González and Ortega (2010) and Peri (2011). Any variation in the 
predicted immigrant density depends only on the initial presence of immigrants and their 
country-of-origin and it is independent of any subsequent municipality-specific shocks that 
determine municipal public spending. 
Some US (Borjas, 1999; and McKinnish, 2005) and non-US studies (Fiva, 2009) have 
found empirical support for the welfare magnets hypothesis which states that welfare generosity 
attracts welfare-prone individuals (and welfare-prone immigrants). The welfare magnets 
hypothesis raises simultaneity concerns since immigrant density would then be the consequence 
and not the cause of welfare spending. However, given the moderate size of welfare spending in 
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Spanish municipalities, we are not particularly concerned by the welfare magnets hypothesis. In 
any case, note that the estimates obtained from the instrumental variables approach described 
here should be robust to welfare-induced location decisions. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 The effect of immigrant density on welfare spending.  
Baseline results: Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the cross-sectional and changes 
specifications outlined above, respectively. Both specifications are estimated using two alternative 
outcome definitions: welfare spending as a percentage of total spending (Panels 2A and 3A) and 
welfare spending per capita (Panels 2B and 3B). All tables share the same structure. The first two 
columns present Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates while columns three and four report 
their 2 Stage Least Squares (2SLS) counterparts. In the first and third columns, besides 
immigration density, we include the fiscal characteristics of municipal governments (grants per 
capita, property tax base, debt service and a set of population size dummies identifying 
homogenous municipalities in terms of expenditure responsibilities and maximum tax rates). In 
the second and fourth columns, we further include controls that reflect the presence of residents 
with specific expenditure needs (young, old and unemployed individuals). Tables A3 and A4, 
deferred to the Annex, contain the 2SLS first-stage and reduced-form estimates. 
     [Insert Table 2] 
Staring with the cross-sectional specifications of Panel A in Table 2, the estimates imply a 
negative effect of immigrant density on welfare spending, measured as a percentage of total 
spending. This result is robust across the model specifications and estimation techniques, 
although the 2SLS estimates are larger - in absolute value - than their OLS counterparts. Taken at 
face value, the 2SLS estimates of column four imply that a one percentage point increase in 
immigrant density reduces welfare spending as a percentage of total spending by 0.37 percentage 
points (3.1 percent of its level). The results reported in Panel B of Table 2 correspond to the 
specifications whereby welfare spending is measured in per capita terms. The qualitative results 
remain unaltered. The most complete 2SLS specification (column four) implies that a one 
percentage point increase in immigrant density reduces welfare spending per capita by 3.3 € (3 
percent of its level). 
As for the control variables, welfare spending, measured as a percentage of the budget, 
increases with current grants, the percentage of young and old individuals and the rate of 
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unemployment. By contrast, it decreases with the property tax base and the debt service. When 
welfare spending is measured in per capita terms, it increases with grants, the property tax base, 
and the percentages of old and young individuals.  
Table 3 presents the changes specifications in which we exploit the within-municipality data 
variation recorded between 1998 and 2006. Welfare spending is measured as a percentage of total 
spending in panel A and in per capita terms in panel B. In all the changes specifications, we 
further include welfare spending in the base year (i.e. 1998) given that mean reversion is a salient 
feature of the spending data we use11. 
    [Insert Table 3] 
The estimates indicate that the increase in welfare spending between 1998 and 2006 was 
lower in those municipalities experiencing the greatest increases in immigrant density during the 
same time window. For both outcomes, the effect is larger (in absolute value) in the 2SLS 
specifications. In fact, the effect is negative but statistically insignificant in the OLS specifications 
in which welfare spending is measured in per capita terms. In the most complete 2SLS 
specifications, the estimates imply that the average increase in immigrant density for the 1998-
2006 period (5.84 percentage points): (i) decreased the percentage of the budget that was 
allocated to welfare by 3.10 points (26 percent of the 2006 level); and (ii) decreased municipal 
welfare spending per capita by 18.40€ (16 percent of the 2006 level). Hence, we can conclude that 
immigrant density exerts a significant – and negative – effect on welfare spending both in 
statistical and economic terms. 
The question as to whether or not the instrument used is a relevant one is addressed in 
Tables A3 and A4. The first-stage results of the cross-sectional specification in Table A3 indicate 
that a one percentage point increase in the predicted immigrant density increased its observed 
counterpart by 0.16 percentage points. The partial R-squared and F-test values of excluded 
instruments are 0.155 and 60.71, indicating that the instrument is relevant. The corresponding 
first-stage results, for the most complete specification in changes, are reported in Table A4. The 
results suggest that an extra percentage point in the predicted 1998-2006 change in immigrant 
density is associated with a 0.10 percentage point increase in the observed change in immigrant 
density for the period 1998-2006. The partial R-squared and F-test values in this changes 
                                                 
11 Notice that including spending in the base year as a control variable induces a mechanical correlation 
between this variable and the error term. In unreported results, we have instrumented welfare spending in 
1998 with its lagged 1996 value. The results remain virtually unchanged.  
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specification are 0.085 and 35.7912. These statistics indicate that the instrument is also relevant in 
the changes specifications. 
Robustness checks: One concern is that immigration changes overall spending, which in turn, 
changes the municipalities’ spending patterns. We estimate the effect of immigrant density on 
total spending per capita. Specifically, we estimate the effect of the 1998-2006 change in 
immigrant density on the contemporaneous change in total spending per capita. The 2SLS 
estimates, which correspond to a specification that includes all the control variables, are reported 
in the first column of Table 4. The estimates indicate that immigrant density has no effect on 
overall spending per capita. This result may reflect the fact that immigration has little impact on 
the per capita resources of municipal governments. On the one hand, grants are distributed on a 
population basis and do not respond to the income level of the municipality. On the other hand, 
the property tax base is based on cadastral values which are updated only very infrequently and, 
therefore, we do not expect immigration inflows to have a great impact on property tax bases. In 
the case of the remaining local taxes (a local business tax, a tax on vehicles, a tax on building 
activities, and a tax on the sale of land and buildings), it is not obvious that per capita tax bases 
would be significantly affected by immigration, either. 
[Insert Table 4] 
The result that immigration did not increase total spending per capita, coupled with a 
contemporaneous decrease in welfare spending, implies that the percentage of spending assigned 
to other spending categories must have increased. To analyze this issue further, we estimate the 
effect of immigration on the percentage of the budget allocated to eight different spending 
categories13. The 2SLS results, which correspond to a specification that includes all the control 
variables, are reported in columns two to nine in Table 4. We find that immigrant density has no 
statistically significant effect on six of the eight spending items considered. We find a weak, 
statistically significant effect on spending in water supply and waste treatment. Perhaps, it is more 
interesting the finding of a positive effect of immigrant density on expenditure dedicated to 
police. Specifically, our estimates imply that the average increase in immigrant density for the 
1998-2006 period increased the percentage of the budget allocated to police by 1.62 percentage 
points (13 percent of the 2006 level). 
                                                 
12 Since the changes specifications include the spending in welfare at the base year, the first-stage results 
are not identical with the two alternative measures of welfare spending. 
13 The addition of welfare spending to these eight categories amounts to total municipal spending. 
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4.2. Further results: The effect of immigrant density on voting behavior. 
Immigrants typically differ from the native population in terms of their level of education, 
earnings, unemployment status and welfare use. Despite that all immigrants (legal and illegal) 
have access to welfare programs provided by the local governments, if natives and immigrants are 
not equally represented in the population of welfare users, a change in immigrant density will 
change the fraction of welfare users in the municipality’s population. If spending in welfare 
adjusts to accommodate a higher (or lower) number of welfare users, immigrant density will have 
a ‘mechanical’ effect on the measures of welfare spending we use. More specifically, if immigrants 
are over (or under) represented in the population of welfare users, the negative effect of 
immigrant density on welfare spending will tend to be underestimated (or overestimated). Of 
course, it would be informative to know the extent to which immigrants are over (or under) 
represented in the population of municipal welfare users. Unfortunately, there are no studies 
examining individual municipal welfare use by ethnic status. 
To address this issue, and to provide more evidence on the link between ethnic 
heterogeneity and redistribution, we examine the municipal vote share of right-wing parties. A 
recent social survey conducted in Spain revealed that 47 percent of the individuals who describe 
themselves as right-wing would be willing to increase taxes in order to raise spending on 
education, health and welfare programs. This figure rises to 62 percent among left-wing 
individuals (Centro de investigaciones Sociológicas, 2010). Thus, we specifically estimate the effect of 
immigrant density on voting behavior regressing the between-elections change in the right-wing 
vote share on the contemporaneous change in immigrant density: 
       ititititit ζλ'sΔvote wing rightρdensity  Δimmigrantηvote wing Δright ++⋅+⋅= 4−                   (5) 
where itvote wing Δright  is the increase in the percentage of the vote accruing to right-wing parties 
between two consecutive local elections (hold at t and at t-4)14. Since municipal elections took 
place in 1999, 2003 and 2007, observations corresponding to 1999-2003 and 2003-2007 changes 
are pooled. The term it'sΔ  is a vector of control variables and includes time dummies, the change 
in the local unemployment rate and changes in the proportion of natives in the following age 
                                                 
14 The sample used here is larger than that used in the expenditure analysis (1,901 vs 895 municipalities). 
Following their political ideology, we have classified as right-wing parties the main conservative party 
(Partido Popular) and some right-wing regionalist parties (e.g., Convergencia i Unió, Unió Valenciana). As left-
wing parties, we consider the Social Democrats (Partido Socialista Obrero Español), the former communist 
party (Izquierda Unida) and other green and/or left-wing regionalist parties (e.g. Iniciativa per Catalunya-Els 
Verds, Bloque Nacionalista Galego, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya).  
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groups: 18-27, 28-37, 38-47, 48-57, 58-67 and >68 years-old. Thus, we are controlling for 
changes on the demographical structure that may correlate with political preferences and thus, 
election results. We also include the initial right-wing vote share to control for mean reversion in 
voting behavior,  
[Insert Table 5] 
The first and second columns of Table 5 present the OLS and the 2SLS results, 
respectively. These results indicate that a rise in immigrant density increases the vote share 
accruing to right-wing parties. In other words, the support for right-wing parties increased more 
in those municipalities experiencing relatively large increases in immigrant density. Taken at face 
value, our 2SLS estimates imply that the average increase in immigrant density between 1998 and 
2006 (5.8 percentage points) would increase the vote share for right-wing parties by 4.9 
percentage points. To the extent that a higher share of the vote being won by right-wing parties 
reflects less support for redistribution, these voting behavior results support the hypothesis that 
ethnic heterogeneity reduces redistribution. Moreover, these results suggest that the negative 
effect of immigrant density on welfare spending is not completely driven by an under-
representation of immigrants in the population of municipal welfare users.  
Our results are in line with the evidence documented by Roemer et al. (2007) for USA, 
UK and France pointing to a positive relationship between the rise of right-wing parties and 
immigration. They are also congruent with the findings of Cebolla-Boado and Jiménez-Buedo 
(2011). This case study shows a positive correlation between immigrant density and the right-
wing vote share across the electoral districts of the city of Madrid. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Spain has recently received a massive immigration wave which, in a short period of time, 
has transformed the country into an ethnically heterogeneous society. Moreover, this inflow of 
immigration has been distributed very unevenly across Spain. We use these demographic changes 
to study the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on redistribution and provide empirical evidence that 
this heterogeneity (proxied by municipal immigrant density) reduces redistribution (proxied by 
municipal welfare spending).  
Our preferred estimates indicate that the average increase in immigrant density for the 
period 1998 to 2006 (5.8 percentage points) led to a fall in the amount of the municipal budget 
allocated to welfare of between 16 and 26 percentage points. We show that these results are not 
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driven by changes in the overall budget attributable to immigrants (finding no effect on total 
spending). Moreover, having conducted a comprehensive analysis of the impact of immigrant 
density on different spending categories, we find that immigrant density increases the share of 
municipal spending allocated to the police. 
Consistent with these results on welfare expenditure, we also find a sizable positive 
impact of immigrant density on the vote share accruing to right-wing parties. Given that right-
wing parties are, in general, less pro-redistribution, these results also point to a negative 
relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and the taste for redistribution (Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2000). However, it should be borne in mind that, besides less redistributive policies, right-wing 
parties also tend to support more restrictive immigration policies. We cannot, therefore, rule out 
the possibility that increased immigrant density strengthened support for the restrictive 
immigration policies favored by right-wing parties that also support less redistributive policies 
(see Lee et al. (2006) and Roemer et al. (2007) for discussions on policy bundling in this context).  
In any case, our findings support the observation made in Alesina and Glaeser (2004) that 
future immigrant inflows to Europe will challenge the current generous welfare state as European 
societies will become more diverse. Furthermore, these same authors claim that as Europe has 
increased in diversity, Europeans have grown increasingly susceptible to racist, anti-welfare 
demagoguery. In Spain, the native population’s perception of the use made by immigrants of the 
country’s welfare services supports this argument. According to a survey conducted by the Centro 
de Investigaciones Sociológicas in 2008, around 50 percent of natives believe that immigrants misuse 
the public health care system. Moreover, almost 50 percent of natives believe that immigrants 
receive more school subsidies and health services than they do, despite both groups having the 
same income. The results of this survey may shed light on the political mechanisms through 
which ethnic heterogeneity may affect redistribution. We consider that a better understanding of 
the workings of these political mechanisms is of paramount importance in future research 
studies. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
Cross section (N=1,293) 
 Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Welfare spending     
Welfare spending i06 (€ per capita) 112 71 0.09 646 
Welfare spending i06  (percentage of total spending) 12.03 7.46 0.01 57.13 
Total spending i06 (€ per capita) 1,005 432 341 4,880 
Welfare spending i98 (€ per capita) 55 40 0 286 
Welfare spending i98 (percentage of total spending) 10.09 6.78 0 42.03 
Total spending i98 (€ per capita) 577 276 183 3,238 
Demographic     
Immigrant density i06 (percentage) 6.78 5.31 0.05 35.77 
Population i06 25,277 111,233 1,863 3,128,600
Control variables      
Current grants i06 (€ per capita) 273.36 92.98 83.68 1080.15 
Property tax base i06 (€ per capita) 19,810 13,219 2,472 222,242 
Debt service i06 (percentage) 6.58 7.87 0 94.74 
Percentage young i06 (<16 years old) 14.49 3.06 3.35 23.76 
Percentage old06i (>64 years old) 18.45 6.23 3.98 48.25 
Unemployment rate i06 4.22 1.86 1.10 14.10 
1998-2006 change (N=895)     
Welfare spending     
∆Welfare spending i98-06 (€ per capita) 56 59 -169 646 
∆Welfare spending i98-06  
(percentage of total spending) 1.72 6.27 -27.75 36.44 
∆Total spending i98-06 (€ per capita) 419 329 -986 4033 
Demographic     
∆Immigrant share i98-06 5.84 4.63 -1.28 31.82 
Control variables     
∆Current grants per capita i98-06 123 65 -189 740 
∆Property tax base i98-06 (€ per capita) 4,495 5,900 -55,367 68,131 
∆Debt service i98-06  (percentage) -2.59 9.74 -66.84 53.47 
∆Percentage young i98-06 (<16 years old) -2.53 2.50 -27.62 6.29 
∆ Percentage old i98-06 (>64 years old) 1.21 2.07 -9.95 7.62 
∆Unemployment rate i98-06 0.19 1.21 -4.50 6.20 
Sources: 1) Spending, grants and debt service (interests plus principal payments over current 
revenues) data from Spanish Ministry of Finance; 2) Welfare spending corresponds to chapter 3 of 
the Clasificación funcional del gasto labelled Seguridad, Protección y Promoción Social ; 3) Demographic 
variables are from Statistics Spain (Padrón Municipal); 3) Property tax base from the Cadastre register; 
4) Unemployment rate (percentage of registered unemployed among individuals aged 16-64 ) from 
Anuario Economico de España. 
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Table 2. The determinants of municipal welfare spending in 2006 (N=1,293) 
A) Welfare spending as a percentage of total spending in 2006 
 OLS 2SLS 
Immigrant density i06 
-0.288*** -0.181*** -0.435*** -0.371*** 
(0.039) (0.041) (0.090) (0.097) 
Control variables     
Current grants per capita i06 
0.016*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Per capita property tax base i06 
(in millions of €) 
-90.589*** -51.275*** -70.236*** -39.299*** 
(18.151) (15.319) (19.467) (14.430) 
Debt service i06 
-0.089*** -0.094*** -0.089*** -0.094*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Municipality size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Share young i06  
(<16 years old) 
 0.502***  0.454*** 
 (0.127)  (0.129) 
Share old i06 
(>64 years old) 
 0.349***  0.300*** 
 (0.069)  (0.073) 
Unemployment rate i06 
 0.518***  0.305* 
 (0.135)  (0.170) 
B) Welfare spending per capita in 2006 
 OLS 2SLS 
Immigrant density i06 
-1.332*** -1.033** -3.393*** -3.308*** 
(0.356) (0.409) (0.924) (1.063) 
Control variables     
Current grants per capita i06 
0.291*** 0.296*** 0.292*** 0.309*** 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040) 
Per capita property tax base i06 
(in millions of €) 
553.663*** 730.801*** 839.975*** 874.132*** 
(125.698) (136.638) (193.011) (173.007) 
Debt service i06 
-0.079 -0.208 -0.078 -0.212 
(0.161) (0.157) (0.167) (0.166) 
Municipality size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Percentage young i06 
(<16 years old) 
 6.456***  5.875*** 
 (1.129)  (1.184) 
Percentage old i06 
(>64 years old) 
 2.591***  2.014*** 
 (0.610)  (0.674) 
Unemployment rate i06 
 1.236  -1.317 
 (1.348)  (1.740) 
Notes: 1) Robust standard errors in parenthesis; 2) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** 
at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level; 3) Municipality size dummies for the following size intervals: 
<5, 5-20, 20-50, 50-100 and >100 thousand inhabitants.  
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Table 3. The determinants of municipal welfare spending, 1998-2006 changes (N=895) 
A) Change in welfare spending as a percentage of total spending (1998-2006) 
 OLS 2SLS 
∆Immigrant share i98-06 
-0.183*** -0.137*** -0.548*** -0.531*** 
(0.040) (0.043) (0.149) (0.159) 
Control variables     
Welfare spending i98 
-0.377*** -0.381*** -0.421*** -0.414*** 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.042) 
∆Current grants per capita i98-06 
0.020*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
∆Per capita property tax base i98-06  
(in millions of €) 
-15.113 -9.976 -47.099 -41.111 
(21.702) (21.901) (28.801) (28.378) 
∆Debt service i98-06 
-0.054*** -0.055*** -0.063*** -0.064*** 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) 
∆Municipality size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
∆Share young i98-06  
(<16 years old) 
 -0.060  -0.132 
 (0.098)  (0.111) 
∆Share old i98-06  
(>64 years old) 
 0.147  -0.263 
 (0.118)  (0.193) 
∆Unemployment rate i98-06 
 0.443**  0.254 
 (0.172)  (0.187) 
B) Change in welfare spending per capita (1998-2006)
 OLS 2SLS 
∆Immigrant density i98-06 
-0.567 -0.499 -3.079** -3.146* 
(0.383) (0.432) (1.456) (1.626) 
Control variables     
Welfare spending i98 
-0.066 -0.068 -0.073 -0.073 
(0.068) (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) 
∆Current grants per capita i98-06 
0.351*** 0.347*** 0.329*** 0.339*** 
(0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073) 
∆Per capita property tax base i98-06 
(in millions of €) 
371.732 377.958 137.299 160.615 
(353.934) (353.813) (358.021) (363.894) 
∆Municipality size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
∆Debt service i98-06 
-0.114 -0.117 -0.187 -0.192 
(0.182) (0.181) (0.199) (0.197) 
∆Percentage young i98-06 
(<16 years old) 
 -1.144  -1.593* 
 (0.870)  (0.950) 
∆Percentage old i98-06 
(>64 years old) 
 -0.376  -3.202 
 (1.053)  (1.983) 
∆Unemployment rate i98-06 
 1.678  0.401 
 (1.627)  (1.759) 
Notes: 1) Robust standard errors in parenthesis; 2) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% 
level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level; 3) ∆Municipality size dummies indicate changes in 
population size crossing the following size intervals: <5, 5-20, 20-50, 50-100 and >100 thousand 
inhabitants. 
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Table 4. The determinants of the 1998-2006 change in municipal spending, 2SLS estimates (N=895) 
 
Total spending 
(€ per capita) 
Percentage of total spending in: 
General 
services  Police  Health  Education 
Housing, 
street lighting 
& parks  
Water supply & 
waste treatment 
Culture and 
sports  
Local roads & 
economic 
development  
∆Immigrant density i98-06 
24.520 -0.124 0.278*** 0.055 -0.019 -0.121 0.421* -0.222 0.048 
(17.150) (0.159) (0.087) (0.061) (0.112) (0.434) (0.226) (0.231) (0.199) 
Control variables          
Spending item i98 
-0.133** -0.424*** -0.308*** -0.864*** -0.710*** -0.748*** -0.798*** -0.747*** -0.004*** 
(0.066) (0.044) (0.038) (0.060) (0.067) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.000) 
∆Current grants per capita i98-06 
1.326*** -0.006 -0.003** 0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.005* 0.002 0.003 
(0.195) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
∆Per capita property tax base i98-06  
(in millions of €) 
5,206.979 25.448 41.394** 2.409 -15.265 -31.887 -80.331* 25.947 58.706 
(4,892.431) (30.365) (18.373) (16.652) (19.149) (61.740) (46.208) (49.988) (62.839) 
∆Debt service i98-06 
4.338*** -0.046** -0.020** -0.012 -0.013 -0.083*** -0.034* -0.023 -0.021 
(1.232) (0.023) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.032) (0.019) (0.022) (0.027) 
∆Municipality size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
∆Share young i98-06 
(<16 years old) 
-14.805 -0.024 0.030 -0.016 0.197* -0.393* 0.141 0.144 0.152 
(14.264) (0.112) (0.037) (0.039) (0.112) (0.203) (0.113) (0.107) (0.128) 
∆Share old i98-06 
(>64 years old) 
-4.718 -0.084 0.282*** -0.104 -0.248 -0.171 0.397 -0.378 0.198 
(17.735) (0.216) (0.102) (0.085) (0.154) (0.510) (0.312) (0.261) (0.272) 
∆Unemployment rate i98-06 
-16.877 0.366* 0.048 0.192** 0.129 -0.044 -0.365* -0.798*** 0.210 
(13.791) (0.189) (0.071) (0.091) (0.123) (0.329) (0.217) (0.267) (0.262) 
Notes: 1) Robust standard errors in parenthesis; 2) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level,** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level; 3) Spending itemi98 is total spending per 
capita in column 1 and the percentage of spending devoted to the appropriate spending item in columns 2 to 9.    
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Table 5. The determinants of the right-wing vote share (N=3,802).  
 OLS 2SLS 
∆Immigrant density it 
0.363*** 0.843** 
(0.079) (0.400) 
Control variables   
Right wing vote it-4 
-0.287*** -0.294*** 
(0.013) (0.014) 
∆Unemployment rate it 
0.237 0.312 
(0.229) (0.236) 
∆Voters’ age groups it Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Notes: 1) The dependent variable is the change in the right-wing vote share 
between municipal elections – pooling the 1999-2003 and 2003-2007 changes; 2) 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the municipality level; 3) *** 
denotes statistical significance at the 1%, ** at the 5%, and * at the 10% levels; 4) 
The ∆voters’ age groupsit is the change in the following age groups as a percentage of 
the natives (including EU-15 citizens): 18-27, 28-37, 38-47, 48-57, 58-67 and >68 
years-old.  
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Figure 1a. Distribution of welfare spending per capita across municipalities. 
  
Notes: Frequency in the vertical axis. In the top (bottom) panel, the number of observations is 1,293 
(895) which corresponds to the estimation sample. 
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Figure 1b. Distribution of welfare spending as a percentage of total spending across 
municipalities. 
 
Notes: Frequency in the vertical axis. In the top (bottom) panel, the number of observations is 
1,293 (895) which corresponds to the estimation sample. 
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          Figure 2.  The Spanish immigration wave: Nationwide population levels and shares  
 
Source: Statistics Spain (INE). 
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Figure 3. Distribution of the percentage of individuals born outside EU-15 countries  
 
Notes: In the top (bottom) panel, the number of observations is 1,293 (895) which corresponds to the 
estimation sample. 
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Annex 
 
Table A1. Municipalities in the estimation sample by population size (in thousands) 
Variable <1 (1-5] (5-20] (20-100] >100 Total 
Sample 0 470 541 230 52 1,293 
All municipalities 4,616 1,813 830 285 56 7,600 
% in sample 0% 26% 65% 81% 93% 17% 
Source: Statistics Spain (INE). 
Notes: These figures exclude the municipalities in the Basque Country and Navarra.  
 
Table A2. Foreign-born individuals by country of origin 
Country           2006           1998  1998-2006
Morocco 605,961 190,497 415,464
Ecuador 456,641 5,335 451,306
Romania 397,270 3,066 394,204
Colombia 286,969 17,928 269,041
United Kingdom 283,667 87,808 195,859
Argentina 271,444 61,323 210,121
Germany 208,933 115,395 93,538
France 199,364 143,023 56,341
Bolivia 140,740 2,581 138,159
Venezuela 124,851 46,388 78,463
Peru 123,464 26,900 96,564
China 104,789 12,036 92,753
Bulgaria 100,763 1,550 99,213
Portugal 93,767 51,303 42,464
Brazil 93,396 19,18 74,216
Dominican Republic 87,111 21,66 65,451
Cuba 79,228 31,223 48,005
Uruguay 76,635 15,577 61,058
Ukraine 69,359 585 68,774
Switzerland 62,632 46,981 15,651
Italy 60,175 17,437 42,738
Chile 57,864 16,984 40,880
Algeria 52,159 16,456 35,703
Source: Statistics Spain (INE). 
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Table A3. Reduced-form and first-stage results, levels specification (N=1,293) 
A) Welfare spending as a percentage of total spending in 2006 
  First-Stage  Reduced-form 2SLS 
Immigrant density i06 
  -0.371*** 
  (0.097) 
i06density Immigrant  
0.156*** -0.058***  
(0.020) (0.015)  
Control variables    
Current grants per capita i06 
0.004*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Per capita property tax base i06 
(in millions of €) 
5.163 -41.217*** -39.299*** 
(13.375) (15.563) (14.430) 
Debt service06i 
0.006 -0.096*** -0.094*** 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) 
Municipality size dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Percentage young i06  
(<16 years old) 
-0.192*** 0.525*** 0.454*** 
(0.071) (0.127) (0.129) 
Percentage old i06  
(>64 years old) 
-0.211*** 0.379*** 0.300*** 
(0.041) (0.068) (0.073) 
Unemployment rate i06 
-1.007*** 0.679*** 0.305* 
(0.069) (0.126) (0.170) 
First-Stage Statistics    
   F-test of excluded instruments 60.71   
   Partial R-squared 0.155   
B) Welfare spending per capita in 2006 
Immigrant density i06 
  -3.308*** 
  (1.063) 
i06density Immigrant  
0.156*** -0.517***  
(0.020) (0.159)  
Control variables    
Current grants per capita i06 
0.004*** 0.297*** 0.309*** 
(0.001) (0.039) (0.040) 
Per capita property tax base i06 
(in millions of €) 
5.163 857.054*** 874.132*** 
(13.375) (154.639) (173.007) 
Debt servicei06 
0.006 -0.231 -0.212 
(0.012) (0.156) (0.166) 
Municipality size dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Percentage young i06 
(<16 years old) 
-0.192*** 6.511*** 5.875*** 
(0.071) (1.135) (1.184) 
Percentage old i06 
(>64 years old) 
-0.211*** 2.712*** 2.014*** 
(0.041) (0.611) (0.674) 
Unemployment rate i06 
-1.007*** 2.013* -1.317 
(0.069) (1.223) (1.740) 
First-Stage Statistics    
   F-test of excluded instruments 60.71   
   Partial R-squared 0.155   
Notes: 1) In the first column, the dependent variable is the immigrant density in 2006; 2) Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis; 3) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, 
and * at the 10% level; 4) The results shown in the third column of panel A (B) are those reported in 
the 4th column of Table 2A (2B). 
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Table A4. Reduced-form and first-stage results, changes specification (N=895)   
A) Change in welfare spending as a percentage of total spending (1998-2006) 
  First-Stage Reduced-form 2SLS 
∆Immigrant density i98-06 
  -0.531*** 
  (0.159) 
06-i98density ΔImmigrant  
0.104*** -0.055***  
(0.017) (0.014)  
Control variables    
Welfare spending i98 
-0.054*** -0.385*** -0.414*** 
(0.018) (0.039) (0.042) 
∆Current grants per capita i98-06 
-0.003* 0.019*** 0.017*** 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
∆Per capita property tax base i98-06 
(in millions of €) 
-45.886* -16.735 -41.111 
(23.549) (22.098) (28.378) 
∆Share of budget spent on debt interests i98-06 
-0.026** -0.050*** -0.064*** 
(0.012) (0.018) (0.021) 
∆Municipality size dummies Yes Yes Yes 
∆Share young i98-06 
(<16 years old) 
-0.207*** -0.022 -0.132 
(0.067) (0.093) (0.111) 
∆Share old i98-06 
(>64 years old) 
-1.024*** 0.281** -0.263 
(0.091) (0.110) (0.193) 
∆Unemployment rate i98-06 
-0.397*** 0.465*** 0.254 
(0.100) (0.171) (0.187) 
First-Stage Statistics    
   F-test of excluded instruments 35.79   
   Partial R-squared 0.085   
B) Change in welfare spending per capita (1998-2006) 
∆Immigrant density i98-06 
  -3.146* 
  (1.626) 
06-i98density ΔImmigrant  
0.109*** -0.344**  
(0.018) (0.164)  
Control variables    
Welfare spending i98 
-0.002 -0.066 -0.073 
(0.003) (0.069) (0.069) 
∆Current grants per capita i98-06 
-0.003* 0.349*** 0.339*** 
(0.002) (0.074) (0.073) 
∆Per capita property tax base i98-06 
(in millions of €) 
-46.485* 306.834 160.615 
(23.732) (345.029) (363.894) 
∆Share of budget spent on debt interests i98-06 
-0.029** -0.102 -0.192 
(0.012) (0.182) (0.197) 
∆Municipality size dummies Yes Yes Yes 
∆Share young i98-06 
(<16 years old) 
-0.201*** -0.961 -1.593* 
(0.066) (0.852) (0.950) 
∆Share old i98-06  
(>64 years old) 
-1.041*** 0.072 -3.202 
(0.092) (0.937) (1.983) 
∆Unemployment rate i98-06 
-0.395*** 1.644 0.401 
(0.100) (1.620) (1.759) 
First-Stage Statistics    
   F-test of excluded instruments 38.72   
   Partial R-squared 0.095   
Notes: 1) In the first column, the dependent variable is the change in immigrant density from 1998 to 
2006; 2) Robust standard errors in parenthesis; 3) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 
the 5% level, and * at the 10% level; 4) The results shown in the third column of panel A (B) are those 
reported in the 4th column of Table 3A (3B). 
 
